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One way of summarizing the aim of my book is to identify and address a range of 
theological issues that become apparent when we take animals to be the subject of 
theological interest, and to demonstrate that many of the ways we have drawn theological 
boundaries between human and non-human animals are in need of rethinking. The critical 
questions raised by the preceding evaluations of my project can be split into two groups. 
First, arguments that the issues I raise are not problematic after all, or that the remedies I 
propose are unattractive. All four authors variously take issue with my discussion 
regarding doctrines of humanity made in God's image, the doctrine of the incarnation, the 
identification of humans as creatures, the abandonment of a Neo-Platonic creaturely 
hierarchy, and anthropocentrism. The second set of critical questions judge that more 
theological innovation will be necessary in order to meet my goals, most clearly David 
Fergusson's argument in relation to a personal doctrine of God. I remain persuaded, on 
the one hand, that the new theological construals for which I argue are necessary for 
Christian theology to address animals adequately and, on the other hand, that it is not 
necessary to revise our doctrine of God in order so to do. In this response I will hope to 
show that this occupation of a middle ground does not leave me sitting uncomfortably on 
a wobbly fence. I will treat each of the issues raised by the papers, and listed above, in 
turn. 
First, then, it seems that my preoccupation in the book with the doctrine of 
humans as the image of God needs explication (Clough, 2012, 64–67, 100–102). This 
topic needs consideration when we attend to animals, in my view, primarily because the 
doctrine seems to be the focal point of most theological claims that humans are uniquely 
or centrally objects of God's concern in creation and redemption. For as long as we 
erroneously believe that there is something godly about the human species that lifts us 
above the rest of the created order — with the possible exception of angelic beings — we 
will be stuck in bad patterns of theology and worse patterns of ethics in relation to the 
rest of creation. It is theologically important to recognize that there is nothing in the 
human make-up that makes us godlike, contra the Stoic belief that our unique rationality 
was a divine attribute uniting us with the heavenly realm. God is God and we are not — 
not even a little bit. If we image God — and I take this to be an open question — it is, in 
Christian theological terms, to the extent that we participate in the true image of God, 
Jesus Christ, and fulfil the vocation God has set before us. 
I judge Christopher Carter’s proposal to retain the traditional identification of our 
minds with the image of God [INSERT CROSS-REF to Carter para. beginning ‘Jesus 
was able to utilize…] to be particularly problematic, because, as Hans Reinders among 
many others has argued (Reinders, 2008), once we have done this it is hard to resist the 
implication that those with less cognitive ability image God less well and are 
consequently less human than others. Margaret Adam argues that we do not need to 
expand the image of God beyond the human in order to understand our moral 
responsibility towards other creatures [INSERT CROSS-REF to Adam para. headed 
‘Care for particular creatures] but I suggest we do need to do so in order to be faithful to 
Christian Scripture and tradition. In the Bible, lions, hens, lambs and doves and other 
stranger creatures frequently image God (e.g. Isa. 31.4–5; Mt. 23.37; Jn 1.29; Mk 1.10; 
Rev. 5.6). Among later theological authors, Augustine and Aquinas, to name but two, 
affirmed that a trace of the trinity is found in every creature (Aquinas, 1963, I, qu. 45, a. 
7, citing Augustine’s citing Augustine’s de Trinitate). Stephen Webb argues that an 
account of imaging God as a human vocation is residually anthropocentric [INSERT 
CROSS-REF to Webb sentence: ‘For Clough, the difference between humans and non-
human animals is primarily vocational, a position that is indicative of a residual 
anthropocentrism in his thought.’], but I disagree that this is the case. Every creature 
plays its own role before God and therefore can be said to have its own vocation: it is 
called into being by God and is called to take its particular part in the earthly chorus of 
divine worship, whether supernova or hill or stream or tree or worm or hedgehog or 
human. I remain convinced, therefore, that theologians need to give much more careful 
consideration to how to speak well concerning the image of God in a more-than-human 
context, and that the Christological emphasis for which I argue (Clough, 2012, 100–102).  
will be a crucial element in doing this well. 
The second key topic raised by the authors is that of incarnation. In various ways, 
they each ask what is wrong with an account of the incarnation that says that God became 
incarnate in the particular human being Jesus Christ and in so doing redeemed all 
creation. My answer is that there is nothing at all wrong with this theological claim, 
provided it is construed correctly. I am in full agreement with Adam and Webb in 
affirming the scandalous particularity of Christian doctrine in this area [INSERT 
CROSS-REFS to Adam para ‘The Particularity of Jesus Christ’ & Webb sentence ‘If the 
Word did not become a particular person, then it seems to me that God has not fully, 
without reserve, entered into the world.’]: the redemption of the Universe is effected in 
the life and death of one single creature. I also agree with Adam that soteriology cannot 
function with a ‘like-saves-like’ logic [INSERT CROSS-REF to Adam sentence ‘This 
change trades one like-saves-like (divine-human-saves-human) for another (divine-flesh-
saves-flesh, and risks losing the both the particularity of the incarnation and the 
corresponding particularity of those redeemed.’]. If we do not take care, however, we are 
in danger of using Christology to prop up our sense of species self-importance. Let us 
take a parallel example: according to the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, it is right 
to believe that the particular creature God became was male, but it is wrong to believe 
that Christ's maleness means only males are reconciled to God, or that God's incarnation 
as male privileges males over females. In the same way, it is right to believe that the 
particular creature God became belonged to the human species, but it is wrong to believe 
that Christ's membership of this species means only humans are reconciled to God, or 
that God's incarnation as a member of this species privileges it over other species. I am 
inclined to think, therefore, that it is as unwise to try to find reasons that incarnation had 
to be human, as it is to find reasons that the incarnation had to be male. My problem is 
not with the particularity of the incarnation, therefore, but with theological generalizing 
about it at the arbitrary level of species. Christian have mostly concluded, thank God, that 
it is a bad idea to generalise about the gender of Christ, but for some reason we continue 
to think that generalizing about the species of Christ is legitimate. We need either to stick 
with the particularity of this one creature named Jesus Christ, or if we ever need to 
generalize, the best generalization is to say simply that God became a creature. 
David Fergusson argues that my claim that the species of the creature in which 
God because incarnate is incidental in the same way as its gender brings us to ‘a reductio 
ad absurdum of traditional soteriological claims’ [INSERT CROSS-REF to Fergusson], 
where the Word of God might as well have been a crocodile or hippopotamus. I agree 
that a crocodile Christ is an absurdity within salvation history as we know it — however 
many ideas it provokes for theological cartoons — but considering other alternative 
features of the particularity of the incarnation are equally absurd. If Jesus Christ had lived 
as an hermit on some isolated island beyond the fringe of the Roman Empire, with few 
dealings with anyone, it is hard to imagine the incarnation working out in a way that 
would satisfy Fergusson’s core concerns: manipulating geographical particularity 
therefore leads to a similar reductio ad absurdum. If Jesus Christ had lived in the first 
few centuries following the evolution of Homo sapiens, there would have been no 
language with which his contemporaries could have communicated about or recorded 
their experience, and the most we could hope for would then be oral and subsequent 
textual traditions consisting of nothing more than ‘UG!’! Alternatives to the 
chronological particularity of Jesus Christ, then, also lead to absurdity. In another version 
of salvation history, God could have become incarnate in a different place or time, but 
given the salvation history that we inhabit, narrating alternatives are absurd. My 
argument is not that in our salvation history God might as well have become crocodile: 
God becoming human in Jesus Christ must be understood theologically as the pivotal 
point of the whole of salvation history, to which everything leads and from which 
everything follows. My argument is that we cannot pick particular aspects of the 
particularity of the incarnation such as place, time, race, gender, or species, and make a 
special claim for its theological significance. The theological content of the affirmation 
that God became human in Jesus Christ is that this is the way God acted to reconcile and 
redeem creation. It would be truly absurd to indulge our species self-preoccupation to 
such an extent that we conclude in preference that the incarnation means God’s final 
confirmation of human importance among the other creatures. 
The identification of humans as creatures is a third point of concern, identified by 
Carter [INSERT CROSS-REF to Carter heading ‘The language of “creatureliness” in 
light of the imago Dei’]. Carter argues that the recognition of humans as animal creatures 
can have only a problematic reception among African Americans who have been 
denigrated as non-human animals by white Christians over centuries. For those who have 
only recently, if at all, been recognized as being fully human, Carter observes, the 
language of creatureliness risks dehumanizing human beings [INSERT CROSS-REF to 
Carter sentence ‘In this way, I argue that for African Americans, adopting the language of 
“creature” when referring to us not only minimizes our experience as particularized 
African American human beings, it also creates the opportunity for Christian theology to 
repeat past mistakes and dehumanize other human beings who do not conform to certain 
privileged body types.’]. I am of course deeply sympathetic to the after-effects of white 
racist attitudes that considered animality to be a term of abuse and, as a white heir to this 
oppression, I must clearly offer reflection on appropriate theological strategies for dealing 
with this legacy in ongoing dialogue with black fellow-Christians. We must recognize 
parallels here in the identifications of women, or Jews, or persons with disabilities with 
animals supposed to be irrational. I wonder whether the excesses of theological 
anthropocentrism arise in the context of a similar crisis of identity to the one that Carter 
describes. Perhaps, as Walter Brueggemann argues, Genesis 1 is good news to an 
oppressed people in exile that, despite all appearances, they have an important place in 
God's good purposes for the world (1982, 24–5); perhaps African American Christians 
need time fully to receive a similar message before it makes any sense to propose to them 
the humility of the reciprocal recognition of being one kind of animal creature among 
many. 
In the context of Carter’s point about the status of race, I do not believe there is 
anything in my account that would undermine the legitimate recognition of racial 
identity. In proposing that it is theologically appropriate for humans to identify 
themselves as animal creatures, I am not suggesting there is no value in recognizing 
additional particularities in definitions of human identity. Neither am I suggesting that it 
is insignificant to identify as members of the human species. To name human beings 
theologically as human animal creatures is to situate human identity clearly within 
expanding concentric circles. I argue in the book that it is significant to pause at and 
reflect on creatures that fall within the boundary of the human— ground that has been 
well-covered in the theological tradition to date, though clearly not in a way that has been 
adequately attentive to racial identity. My argument is that there is also value in 
considering the creatures that fall within a wider circle: that of the animal (Clough, 2012, 
xx-xxiii). There is nothing in this scheme that suggests it would be inappropriate to 
consider relevant boundaries within that of the human animal creature, such as race. In 
sum, while recognizing the very acute sensitivities that arise from the great injustice done 
in identifying African Americans with non-human animals, I do not see the situation of 
any humans being advanced through the denial that, beyond our common humanity, all 
humans also share characteristics with other animal and non-animal creatures.  
Stephen Webb concludes that I remain a weak anthropocentrist despite my 
confused protestations, and that my rejection of the elaborate Neo-Platonic chain of being 
in favour of a flattened bi-polarity between God and creatures unhelpfully elevates the 
body/soul divide [INSERT CROSS-REF to whole of Webb article]. Regarding the latter 
point, I think our dualities are missing each other. The bi-polarity I am defending is 
creator/creature, not material/spiritual. All the angels and archangels, together with 
anything that is spiritual in earthly creatures, belongs on our creaturely side of this divide, 
as does the entirety of the new creation to which Christians look forward. In Christ alone 
that duality is overcome. I do not think we can live with a great chain of being of 
creatures any more than we can live with the orders within humanity it specified. I do not 
think we have any proper grounds to believe we participate more fully in the divine than 
the lilies or the birds of the air, the busy ant or the rejoicing hills (Mt 6.26–8; Prov. 6.6–8; 
Ps 98.8) . As far as we know, we think and talk more about our participation, and we 
certainly do it in a way that is particular to us, but humans are very apt to measure 
participation in the divine on the basis of attributes we are already convinced are human 
strengths. We need, therefore, a very different theological account of creaturely 
difference, which I explore in On Animals I, Chapter 3. 
As regards Webb’s charge that I am confusedly and weakly anthropocentric 
[INSERT CROSS-REF to Webb’s second paragraph], my hope that my account is 
attentive to complexity rather than merely confused. The kind of perspectival 
anthropocentrism I consider inevitable is, it seems to me, not properly termed 
anthropocentrism at all. I do recognize that we view the world as humans and that our 
moral task begins in this context (Clough, 2012, xxii-xxiii); I do not believe that the 
centrality we inevitably have in our own worlds corresponds to human centrality from a 
divine point of view. In fact, it seems to me that confusing our point of view with God's 
is the root of much of our problems in this area. I do not think this position qualifies as 
even weak anthropocentrism: a wholly altruistic person still looks at the world with 
themself at the centre, but should not for that reason be accused of even weak egoism. 
Fergusson suggests my book is misleadingly described as systematic theology 
[INSERT CROSS-REF to Fergusson sentence ‘The sub-title ‘systematic theology’ may 
be somewhat misleading, since this is a work that nowhere deals with the doctrine of 
God.’]. Clearly, the book does not present a comprehensive account of all topics in 
systematic theology, but if this were a requirement whenever we used the term, it could 
only be applied to works on the scale of Thomas’s Summa theologica or Barth’s Church 
Dogmatics, and even then we might find aspects wanting. My project aims to be 
systematic in method, rather than extent. I gratefully leave to others the task of setting out 
and defending the presuppositions and structure of an aspirationally comprehensive 
theological system; my work instead seeks to draw attention to significant problems in 
the coherence of traditionally conceived theological systems that become apparent when 
one thinks about animals, and to propose remedial action. Even if we are not initially 
motivated by concern for other animals, I am arguing that this issue needs urgent and 
sustained theological attention, just to keep the systematic theology show on the road. It 
is not always appreciated that Descartes was motivated to propose the ludicrous theory 
that non-human animals were automata by a concern about the plausibility of Christian 
doctrine of the afterlife (Descartes, 1968, 76). In the 400 years since, his theory has been 
roundly rejected, but, mystifyingly, theologians have, almost exclusively, been asleep at 
the wheel in trying to provide a better account of the place of other animals, despite the 
apologetic need to respond to the challenge of evolutionary theory that has arisen in the 
meantime. An additional particular problem I am seeking to address is that many 
Christians, committed as I am to this traditional framework, seem to believe that it 
instrumentalizes the entire non-human creation to human ends, on divine authority. I 
consider this to be a profound theological mistake, if not a blasphemy, with the dire and 
ungodly ethical consequence of, once again, falsely claiming God's blessing for our cruel 
exploitation of weaker fellow creatures. My book primarily succeeds or fails, then, on 
whether it convinces Christian theologians who take broadly traditional views of 
Christian Scripture and tradition, that there are problems with the coherence of our 
theology here, and that these sources are not well read as establishing humans as God's 
sole or focal end in creation, reconciliation and redemption. This is the modest doctrinal 
ground that needs to be gained, in my view, in order to argue for the radical changes in 
the practice of Christians towards other animals that will be the focus of volume II. 
Fergusson also makes the much more challenging point that my implicit personal 
doctrine of God may be at odds with my espoused rejection of most forms of 
anthropocentrism. I take seriously his citing of Hume's point that if we were intelligent 
spiders we would be likely to use spiderly metaphors to talk about God. Our personal 
language about God is similarly metaphorical: we should have confidence that used 
rightly and by God's grace our language names something true about God, but we should 
remain acutely alert to divine/human differences. Human agency, for example, may well 
be more like the agency of a tree than it is like God's agency. Our theology and worship 
are a human-specific mode of response to God rather than the unique earthly use of the 
songs of the angels. A personal doctrine of God is therefore only problematic if we place 
human and divine personhood on some continuum, or if we exaggerate the value of 
personhood, or both. I do want to show that even personal concepts such as sin are porous 
in relation other animals, but it works the other way around, too: 'Go to the ant, you 
sluggard' says Proverbs (6.6); consider the birds of the air and the lilies, says Jesus (Mt 
6.26-9): there are ways that humans need to strive to imitate the virtues of non-personal 
creatures. I suggest, therefore, that is not our doctrine of God that needs to change but our 
renewed appreciation of the difference between doctrine of God and theological 
anthropology. 
Fergusson also challenges me to specify where I sit on a spectrum that has strong 
anthropocentrism at one end and indeterminate variety with no especial human 
significance on the other. I think we can start on this task by stating clearly the 
hypothetical judgement that God could have created a universe that glorified Godself and 
allowed the participation of creatures in the triune life without human beings. As another 
boundary marker, in the context of climate change it is less hypothetical to state that there 
could be a future for life in God's Universe after the extinction of human life. Beyond 
these broad benchmarks, I submit that it is not spiritually healthy to try to rate our relative 
importance to God in comparison to other creatures, any more than it would be healthy 
for you or I to try to rate our personal importance to God among fellow human beings. By 
God's grace we each find ourselves here, in a particular creaturely context, with a 
particular creaturely task before us. I propose we spend more time trying to do that well, 
and less time preoccupied with creaturely league table rankings. 
In conclusion, once we have noticed the significance of other animal creatures for 
the theological project, we cannot avoid the hard task of revisiting what we thought we 
knew of Christian doctrine to ask if it still makes sense with this larger referent in view. 
My hope was that this book would provoke such reflection and conversation among 
Christian theologians and I am therefore most grateful to my interlocutors for this debate 
and interchange. Much more such exploration is necessary, well beyond the topics the 
book treats, though we must not use this quest to think better in relation to other animals 
to defer or delay the still more urgent demand to act better, which is the topic of On 
Animals vol. II: Theological Ethics (forthcoming, 2015). Adam reminds us that the 
relationship between right belief and right practice is much more complex than seeing 
them respectively as cause and effect [INSERT CROSS-REF to Adam sentence ‘This is a 
challenge well worth pursuing, even and especially if we cannot document cause and 
effect relationships between vision and practice in the short term.’]. Perhaps finding ways 
to recognize in practice the belief that other animals are our fellows, like us created, 
reconciled, and redeemed by God, is the most important next step in good theological 
thinking concerning them. 
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